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IMPORTING DAUBERT TO
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES THROUGH
THE INFORMATION QUALITY ACT
Wendy E. Wagner*
INTRODUCTION
Exasperated at the inability of the common law to adequately
protect the public health and environment from toxic hazards,
Congress passed a series of vigorous environmental laws in the
1970s to regulate activities involving dangerous products and
wastes.1 The common law had proven woefully ineffective to
redress these harms since it required proof of harm and convincing
evidence of causation before granting recovery. Stringent common
law causation requirements thus effectively exculpated most
defendants who produced or disposed of toxics due to substantial
scientific unknowns regarding the long-term effects of their

* Joe A. Worsham Centennial Professor of Law, University of Texas
School of Law.
1
See, e.g., ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION:
LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 72 (3d ed. 2000) (arguing that the “inadequacies of
the common law” help explain the “rapid growth of regulatory legislation”);
SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK:
RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 15 (2003).
When Congress adopted risk regulation, it rejected the common law
paradigm in favor of a regulatory system which would reduce
technological risks before they caused significant harm to individuals
and the environment. Congress accomplished this goal by designing
statutory triggers that permit the government to act on the basis of
anticipated harm.
Id.
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activities.2 Congress appreciated these inherent limitations in the
common law and developed a broad regulatory system that
regulates potential hazards without requiring definitive evidence of
harm as a prerequisite for regulatory control.3
Because the evidentiary demands of the common law and
regulation are so different, regulators and the courts historically
have had little in common when it comes to assessing scientific
evidence. The fact that courts developed a new, vigorous test
called “Daubert”4 to scrutinize scientific evidence in order to
determine whether it is “reliable” before proceeding to trial was
essentially irrelevant to regulators’ assessments of risks.5
Regulators generally err on the side of protecting the public health
and environment when crafting protective regulatory standards and
do not require vigorous gate-keeping of scientific evidence in order
to avoid juror confusion or the excessive transaction costs
associated with trials.6
With the passage of the Information (or Data) Quality Act
(IQA) in 2001,7 however, the foundations of these heretofore
separate institutional worlds are beginning to collide. The IQA
imposes an evidentiary screening process on regulatory agencies
2

See generally Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture
of Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 790-96 (1997) (summarizing
common law standards).
3
See, e.g., SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 1, at ch. 3; see also Wendy
E. Wagner, The ‘Bad Science’ Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate over the Role of
Science in Public Health and Environmental Regulation, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 63, 85-87 (2003) (listing the environmental statutes that require only
limited evidence of harm as a precondition to regulation).
4
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
5
Not surprisingly, a review of the entire Federal Register reveals that the
Daubert case was referenced only four times by a federal agency and never in a
way that was intended to alter or supplement the agency’s independent
assessment of technical information. Search on Westlaw for term “Daubert” in
Federal Register database, November 5, 2003, with date restriction “aft 1/1993”
(the date Daubert was published).
6
See infra Part I.A (discussing EPA’s congressional directive to err on the
side of protection in their regulations).
7
Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year
2001 § 515, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 144 Stat. 2763 (2001).
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that looks very much like the courts’ Daubert test since it equips
regulatory participants with the opportunity to file complaints for
“correction” of information disseminated by agencies that they
believe is unreliable.8 Just as Daubert motions seek to exclude
scientific testimony that cannot be validated, IQA complaints
generally seek to exclude “unreliable” research from public
dissemination or agency use.9 The IQA thus provides a rather
dramatic signal of growing institutional overlap in the processes
governing the use of scientific information for regulation and
common law adjudication.10
In this commentary, I discuss this new convergence heralded
by the Daubert-like test imposed on administrative agencies,
particularly the Environmental Protection Agency, and consider its
significance. While some celebrate an added check on regulatory
decision-making as a positive development,11 this essay
approaches the IQA more skeptically given its thin justification
and suspicious, industry-based origins.12 Part I provides
background on the agencies’ use of scientific information and the
changes to these practices introduced by the IQA. Part II explores
whether some of the most problematic features of Daubert are
likely to be replicated, and even amplified, in the administrative
agencies as they implement the IQA. Part III closes with two
reforms to the IQA and Daubert that promise to reduce at least
some of their worst adverse effects, while maximizing the benefits
of imposing an added screening test to sort the “good” science
from the “bad.”
BACKGROUND ON THE INFORMATION QUALITY ACT

I.

Agencies have considerable capacity to consider a range of
scientific research that has bearing on public health and
environmental protection. Most importantly, the agencies’
8

Id.
See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (discussing IQA petitions).
10
See, e.g., infra Part II.A.4.
11
See, e.g., Frederick R. Anderson, Data Quality Act, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 14,
2002, at B9.
12
See Part I.B.
9

WAGNERMACRO2.DOC

592

4/23/2004 12:54 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

authorizing statutes generally direct them to bypass heavy burdens
of proof in promulgating regulations, thus allowing them to
consider all available science. By contrast, common law judges
must ensure the reliability of proffered scientific evidence early in
the litigation in order to preserve precious judicial and litigant
resources.13 Also in contrast to the courts, agencies are staffed with
hundreds of experts and can press still more into the service of
overseeing the quality of scientific evidence used for regulation.
Courts do not have such expert support and instead are hamstrung
by limited resources and prohibitions against ex parte contact that
constrain their ability to access expertise outside of the litigation.14
This background section considers the agencies’ use and oversight
of scientific evidence relative to the common law courts both
before and after passage of the IQA.
A. Checks on the Quality of Science Used for Regulation
Agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
have developed multiple oversight processes to ensure that they
find and use the best available science in their regulation,
especially when public health is in jeopardy from the failure to
regulate proactively.15 The process for incorporating science into
regulation is messy; politics and economic interests often drive and
sometimes affect the resolution of the decision-making exercise.16
But in contrast to courts, there are numerous internal and external
checks to ensure that an agency uses science wisely in its decision13

See sources cited supra note 3.
See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein & Catherine Wimberly, Secrecy in Law and
Science, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 27-29 (2001) (discussing limitations on the
ability of judges to do independent research on scientific issues raised in a case).
15
See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 3, at 65, 81-86 (describing the checks and
balances that apply to EPA science).
16
See, e.g., Nicholas A. Ashford et al., A Hard Look at Federal Regulation
of Formaldehyde: A Departure from Reasoned Decisionmaking, 7 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 342 (1983) (“EPA’s formaldehyde deliberations powerfully
illustrate the ease with which matters of policy may be confused with matters of
science . . . [EPA’s] analysis purports to justify, in the name of science, a risk
assessment policy far less protective of human health than the agency’s prior
policy.”).
14
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making. For example, to ensure their scientific assessments are
competent, agencies often empanel experts to oversee their use of
science in regulatory decisions17 and routinely employ various
forms of internal and external peer review.18 In cases when science
has direct regulatory consequences, agencies also risk an appeal to
the court of appeals by those concerned with the factual veracity of
their rulemakings.19 Controversial technical decisions made by
agencies are scrutinized informally by Congress (usually in the
course of oversight hearings), and in exceptional cases, the public.
Because of its vulnerability to multiple reprimands from the courts,
Congress, the White House, and the public at large, agencies have
many reasons to get the science right the first time, particularly
when their science-based decisions have direct and significant
consequences for public health and the economy.
These multiple checks and balances substantially improve the
scientific grounding of resulting regulatory products. At least in the
case of EPA, various expert advisory panels, including the
National Academy of Science (NAS), and prominent academics
conclude that EPA does a satisfactory-to-good job identifying
reliable science and using it in regulation.20 Although there
17

Science advisory boards are mandatory for EPA’s promulgation of air
quality standards and for regulatory action on pesticides. See 42 U.S.C. §
7409(d)(2)(B)-(C) (2000); 7 U.S.C. § 136w(d)-(e) (2000); see also 42 U.S.C. §
4365(c)(1) (2000) (establishing a science advisory board to review scientific and
technical information relevant to any proposed action under EPA’s authority if
EPA is forwarding the proposal to any other federal agency for formal review).
18
See, e.g., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PEER REVIEW HANDBOOK (2d ed.
2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/osp/spc/prhandbk.pdf.
19
See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B) (1996).
20
See, e.g., Strengthening Science at the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency—National Research Council (NRC) Findings: Hearing Before the
House Subcomm. on Energy and Env’t, 106th Cong. 106-97 (2000); COMM. ON
RESEARCH & PEER REVIEW IN EPA, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., STRENGTHENING
SCIENCE AT THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: RESEARCH
MANAGEMENT AND PEER REVIEW PRACTICES (2000); TED GREENWOOD,
KNOWLEDGE AND DISCRETION IN GOVERNMENT REGULATION (1984); MARK R.
POWELL, SCIENCE AT EPA: INFORMATION IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS 112-17
(1999); EXPERT PANEL ON THE ROLE OF SCI. AT EPA, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, SAFEGUARDING THE FUTURE: CREDIBLE SCIENCE, CREDIBLE
DECISIONS (1992); SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS
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remains a cluster of critics who argue that EPA routinely uses “bad
science,”21 a closer examination of these charges reveals that most
of the disagreements are in fact over agency policy, rather than
scientific quality, and these critics rarely identify problems with
EPA’s use of science in settings that have direct regulatory
consequences.22 Thus, most of the concrete evidence to date
suggests that EPA is relatively adept at finding and using the best
science available to formulate protective regulations.
In addition, most environmental laws make it clear that not all
science is weighed equally in terms of its implications for
regulation. Because Congress demands that EPA err on the side of
protection in most statutes, EPA is legally justified, if not
compelled, to place lower demands on scientific developments
suggesting that regulations might not be protective enough, and a
higher bar on developments that suggest more permissive
standards are possible without compromising public health. As a
result, the scrutiny required of scientific information used for
regulation also depends on the statute and regulatory context.
B. The Information Quality Act
Against this backdrop of relatively robust internal and external
oversight processes governing EPA’s use of science, the IQA
imposes an entirely new and additional oversight process. The
Act, which was originally passed as an unnoticed rider to an
appropriations bill,23 works by providing interested parties with the

AS POLICYMAKERS (1990)’.
21

See, e.g., Richard Shelby, Accountability and Transparency: Public
Access to Federally Funded Research Data, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 371 (2000);
Sen. James Inhofe et al., Inst. for Policy Innovation, Big Government and Bad
Science: Ten Case Studies in Regulatory Abuse (Bonner R. Cohen, Ph.D. &
Thomas A. Giovanetti, eds. Nov. 30, 1999), available at http://ipi.org/ipi/
IPIPublications.nsf/PublicationLookupFullText/
1C84DBE6BCD5AEE98625683A001A354C; see generally Junkscience.com,
at http://www.junkscience.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2003).
22
See Wagner, supra note 3, at 78-81.
23
From the oral history surrounding its passage, it appears that most
members of Congress were unaware of the Act’s content or existence. See, e.g.,
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ability to file petitions to “correct” information that an agency has
publicized.24 This correction process must include an appeal
process inside the agency.25 The Act has broad coverage:
“Disseminated information”26 should be corrected if it is found to
lack “reliability,” “objectivity,” “integrity,” or “utility”27 and
“information” is interpreted to include essentially anything but
opinions from agency staff, thus covering far more than narrow
categories of “data” or “science.”28 Moreover, the Act reaches
NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., ENSURING THE QUALITY OF DATA DISSEMINATED BY THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: WORKSHOP # 1, at 32 (April 21, 2002) [hereinafter
NAS,
DATA
QUALITY
TRANSCRIPT,
DAY
1],
available
at
http://www7.nationalacademies.org/stl/4-21-02_Transcript.doc (comments of
Alan Morrison) (stating that the Data Quality Act “came up as part of a very
large appropriations act that most people didn’t even know contained this
particular piece of legislation in it”). It also appears from the oral history that it
was an industrial lobbyist, Jim Tozzi, who leads the Center for Regulatory
Effectiveness, and not a congressional staffer that drafted and guided the rider
through Congress. See, e.g., James T. O’Reilly, The 411 on 515: How OIRA’s
Expanded Information Roles in 2002 Will Impact Rule-Making and Agency
Publicity Actions, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 835, 840 n.20 (2002) (“Discussion at the
American Bar Association Fall Administrative Law Conference dinner . . .
honoring past directors of the OIRA, suggested that Jim Tozzi, former OIRA
director, had been the principal drafter of the 515 language.”).
24
Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year
2001 § 515, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 144 Stat. 2763 (2001).
25
See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing
the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by
Federal Agencies; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. 8452, 8459 (Feb. 2, 2002)
[hereinafter OMB Data Quality Guidelines].
26
“Disseminate” means putting out into the public view, although there are
a number of exemptions, some of which exempt regulatory information that
regulated parties submit. Id.
27
Id.
28
Specifically, “information” means:
any communication or representation of knowledge such as facts or
data, in any medium or form, including textual, numerical, graphic,
cartographic, narrative, or audiovisual forms. This definition includes
information that an agency disseminates from a web page, but does not
include the provision of hyperlinks to information that others
disseminate. This definition does not include opinions where the
agency’s presentation makes it clear that what is being offered is
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back to information disseminated before passage of the Act,
sweeping older agency documents within the scope of potential
IQA challenges.29
The IQA is quite new—only mid-way through its second year
of implementation—thus it is still early to predict how it will be
used by regulatory participants. To date there have been only a few
IQA challenges, averaging about one per month for the main target
of the IQA, the EPA.30 Nonetheless, most of these petitions are
major and take on significant, science-based regulatory
developments.31 For example, in spring 2003, the Competitive
Enterprise Institute (CEI) filed a complaint petitioning several
agencies to withdraw the climate change models used in the
National Assessment on Climate Change from agency websites and
other public databases, arguing that they were unreliable.32 CEI’s

someone’s opinion rather than fact or the agency’s views.
Id. at 8460.
29
See, e.g., Morgan Lewis & Bockius Request for Correction (Aug. 19,
2003) [hereinafter Morgan, Lewis, & Bockius Petition] (seeking correction of
information contained in a 1986 EPA publication entitled Guidance for
Preventing Asbestos Disease Among Auto Mechanics (the “Gold Book”)),
available at http://www.epa.gov/oeiinter/qualityguidelines/afreqcorrectionsub/
12467.pdf.
30
See Envtl. Prot. Agency, Requests for Correction Submitted to EPA,
available at http://www.epa.gov/quality/information guidelines/ipg-list.html
(last updated Mar. 17, 2004).
31
For a summary of IQA petitions filed by industry against both public
health and environmental agencies, see Ctr. for Regulatory Effectiveness, Status
of Data Quality Act Petitions, available at http://www.thecre.com/quality/
20030211_cei.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2004).
32
See Competitive Enter. Inst., Petition to Cease Dissemination of the
National Assessment on Climate Change (Feb. 20, 2003) [hereinafter CEI
Petition], available at http://www.cei.org/pdf/3360.pdf (last visited Mar. 1,
2004). The agencies denied the petitions and CEI’s internal appeals. CEI then
appealed its case to the D.C. District Court where CEI ultimately withdrew its
case. See, e.g., Press Release, Competitive Enterprise Institute, CEI Global
Warming Suit Draws Ire of Northeast States Attorneys General (Aug. 23, 2003),
available at http://www.cei.org/gencon/003,03598.cfm. The petition was
ultimately withdrawn because CEI believed the Bush administration adequately
acknowledged the weaknesses of the models. Press Release, Competitive Enter.
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approach—focusing on significant regulatory information and
asking for its withdrawal—is repeated in other major IQA petitions
filed against EPA, including technical petitions seeking the
withdrawal or exclusion of: pathbreaking research on the endocrine
disruption properties of Atrazine; brochures warning auto
mechanics about risks of exposure to asbestos from brake linings;
an EPA technical review of Diisonoyl phthalate (DINP), a toxin
used in PVC products; and a letter requesting EPA to ignore public
interest group comments on dioxin risks in a biosolids rule and
threatening an IQA action if EPA relies on the comments.33
All of these IQA petitions bear a striking resemblance to
Daubert motions. Like Daubert, the requested remedy often
involves complete exclusion or withdrawal of the challenged
information from public databases.34 Also like Daubert, the criteria
for “good” versus “bad” science or science-related information is
amorphous, but the inability to validate or replicate the study is one
of the primary grounds for challenging the information. Finally,
those filing the complaints generally do not limit their concerns to
scientific quality or reliability, but also contest embedded
judgments and policy choices in the agencies’ use of scientific
research, even though the challenges are framed as if they
concerned only technical information.35
Inst., White House Acknowledges Climate Report Was not Subjected to Sound
Science Law: CEI Drops Lawsuit against Bush Administration (Nov. 6, 2003),
available at http://cei.org/gencon/003,03740.cfm.
33
See, e.g., Kans. Corn Growers Ass’n, The Triazine Network, & the Ctr.
for Regulatory Effectiveness, Request for Correction of Information Contained
in the Atrazine Environmental Risk Assessment, Docket No. OPP – 34237A, at
2 (Nov. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Atrazine Petition], available at
http://www.thecre.com/pdf/petition-atrazine2B.pdf; Morgan Lewis & Bockius
Petition, supra note 29; Ctr. for Regulatory Effectiveness, Request to EPA for
Correction of “Technical Review of Diisononyl Phthalate,” Oct. 16, 2003
[hereinafter CRE Phthalate Petition], available at http://www.epa.gov/
oei/qualityguidelines/afreqcorrectionsub/13166rfc.pdf; Letter from William G.
Kelly, Center for Regulatory Effectiveness (CRE) to EPA Water Docket (Feb.
27, 2003) [hereinafter Kelly letter], available at http://www.thecre.com/pdf/
20030310_biosolids.pdf.
34
See supra notes 32 & 33.
35
See infra Section II.A.1.
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II. IMPORTING MISCHIEF?
On the surface, the similarities between Daubert and the IQA
would seem a positive development since agencies and courts will
adopt similar standards and processes for reviewing and screening
science used in legal decision-making. But there are important
institutional differences between the agencies and the courts that
could lead the IQA to be more damaging and potentially
counterproductive as compared with the courts’ use of Daubert.
First, unlike Daubert, IQA challenges are not adversarial and do
not provide potential opponents with notice or a formal
opportunity to contest petitions.36 Under the IQA, an interested
party simply sends a letter to an agency asking for information to
be withdrawn, and the complaints are resolved by the agencies
without the benefit of broader public input. Second, the decisionmaker is a political agency, rather than a “neutral” jurist. The
resulting decisions are thus more likely to be affected by politics,
even though the decisions might purport to be based on the
agency’s scientific judgment.37 Third and compounding the first
two problems, agency resolutions of IQA petitions become
national proclamations about the quality of the science underlying
disseminated information. By contrast, in the courts the resolution
of scientific quality is most often resolved at the trial court level
and is thus limited in its impact.38 Fourth, it is not clear what
administrative problems the IQA is intended to fix, again a stark
contrast with the courts’ need for some means of overseeing
scientific evidence introduced into the trial process. At least with
respect to EPA, for example, there is little evidence of a problem

36

At least one interest group has filed a counter-challenge on a Data
Quality petition, presumably because the organization learned of the petition
before it was decided and had the resources to object. See OMB Watch, Analysis
on the Petition against the US Fish and Wildlife Service on Salmon Farming,
4
NO.
10
OMB
WATCHER,
available
at
VOL.
http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/1521//.
37
See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk
Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (1995).
38
Cf. General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
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with the quality of science used in regulation.39 Current legal
protections that govern agency decision-making, most specifically
the notice and comment and appeal processes,40 moreover, make
the IQA process largely superfluous and redundant.41
Compounding concerns about the capability of the IQA to
improve the quality of regulatory science are deficiencies that
afflict the IQA’s model—Daubert—itself. Recent research
suggests that Daubert is producing some unexpected, but
potentially serious adverse side effects, even in its more modest
use by the courts. First, since Daubert situates the judge as the
expert who must determine the reliability and validity of scientific
testimony,42 there is a risk of significant, substantive errors in
admissibility rulings. Such substantive errors not only threaten to
impair the accuracy of adjudications, but could alienate the
scientific community and undercut the legitimacy of the courts.43
Daubert also imposes significant new process costs on both
litigants and judges. Daubert can thus alter the adversarial playing
field simply by virtue of the added time and resources it demands.
These problems with Daubert appear to be repeated and amplified
by the agencies as they implement the IQA.

39

See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
In addition, at the time the Data Quality Act was passed, EPA had
already developed four separate programs dedicated to ensuring the quality of
information relevant to regulation, including an electronic error correction
system. See, e.g., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Draft Data Quality Guidelines, 67
Fed. Reg. 21,234 (proposed Apr. 30, 2002) (describing four separate
mechanisms in place to ensure the “quality, objectivity, utility and integrity” of
information used and produced by EPA).
41
See Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB’s Dubious Peer Review Procedures, 34
ENVTL. L. REP. 10064, 10065 (2003).
42
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
43
See, e.g., THE PROJECT ON SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND PUBLIC POLICY
(SKAPP), DAUBERT: THE MOST INFLUENTIAL CASE YOU’VE NEVER HEARD OF
(2003) [hereinafter SKAPP REPORT] (report by scientists critical of Daubert),
available at http://www.defendingscience.org/pdf/DaubertReport.pdf.
40

WAGNERMACRO2.DOC

600

4/23/2004 12:54 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
A. Substantive Errors in Applying a Daubert-like Test to Sort
Reliable Science from Unreliable Science
1. Blurring the Line between Science and Policy

Under Daubert, courts have struggled with expert testimony
that is only partly based on testable research, like weight-of-theevidence judgments on causation that string together a series of
disparate studies.44 The controversy over the Sandoz case, where
the trial judge excluded the experts’ weight-of-the-evidence
testimony as inadmissible under Daubert, is a recent example of
this struggle.45 In that case, even though the individual studies and
reports supported a hypothesis that there was a causal connection
between plaintiffs’ stroke and defendant’s medicine, Parlodel, the
district court held that the experts’ testimony presenting this
causation hypothesis did not pass Daubert’s reliability test.46 As a
result, the district court granted summary judgment to defendants
since plaintiffs had no remaining scientific evidence in support of
causation, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.47 The opinion has
been criticized because the judge rejected plaintiffs’ causation
evidence, even though the circumstantial quality of the evidence
arguably presented a weighing decision that the jury is empowered
to make. The Sandoz decision, it is argued, thus blurs the line
between weighing the available evidence, typically a jury decision,
and screening out unreliable science, an evidentiary issue for the
judge.
44

Carl F. Cranor & John A. Eastmond, Scientific Ignorance and Reliable
Patterns of Evidence in Toxic Tort Causation: Is there a Need for Liabilty
Reform?, 64 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 26-45 (2001).
45
Siharath v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (N.D. Ga.
2001), aff’d sub nom. Rider v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir.
2002).
46
Siharath, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 1370 (holding that to prevail, plaintiff must
provide “at least some support for the causal hypothesis in . . . epidemiological
literature, a predictable chemical mechanism, general acceptance in learned
treatises, a plausible animal model, and dozens of well-documented case
reports”).
47
Rider, 295 F. 3d at 1202-03.

WAGNERMACRO2.DOC

SCREENING AGENCY INFORMATION

4/23/2004 12:54 PM

601

These struggles in determining which decisions are best left
exclusively to experts and which involve weight-of-the-evidence
judgments that should be shared with policymakers or jurors are
being repeated, with considerably more confusion, under the IQA.
Despite the fact that the Act purports to apply only to the reliability
of technical information, and not to agency policy judgments, the
petitions filed against EPA repeat this blurring of policy and
science under the guise of scientific fact finding. In one of the most
significant information quality challenges brought to date, the
manufacturer and agricultural users of an herbicide, Atrazine,
sought to exclude a recent series of studies done on the hormonal
effects of Atrazine from EPA’s decision regarding re-registration
of the herbicide .48 The petitioners argue that the science
acceptable for regulation must be conducted only under agencyapproved protocols and since EPA has not yet promulgated tests
for measuring endocrine disruption effects, the studies must be
excluded.49 The industry’s argument, however, has nothing to do
with technical issues, but instead advances a policy position that
new scientific discoveries cannot be considered in regulating
pesticides until after the underlying methods have been formally
promulgated by EPA.
Other IQA petitions also take issue with EPA’s policy
judgments rather than with the technical merits of EPA’s
decisions.50 In one complaint, industry challenged EPA’s barium
risk assessment in large part because it disagreed with the agency’s
conservative assumptions used in preventative regulation.51 In the
48

Atrazine Petition, supra note 33.
Atrazine Petition, supra note 33. Petitioners argue: “EPA’s statements in
the atrazine Environmental Risk Assessment regarding atrazine’s purported
endocrine effects violate government-wide data quality standards. These
government-wide standards require proper test validation before the tests are
considered reliable and reproducible. There are no validated endocrine-effects
tests for atrazine.”Id. at 1.
50
See also Kelly letter, supra note 33 (characterizing risk assessment as a
science that does not involve policy).
51
Chem. Products Div., Request for Correction of the IRIS Barium
Substance File-Information (Oct. 29, 2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/
oei/qualityguidelines/afreqcorrectionsub/2293.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2004);
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Request for Correction of the IRS Barium and
49
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CEI petitions, the organization argued that the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, and by association the Office of
Science and Technology Policy, used flawed models to predict the
effects of global warming and that all reports and data relying on
those models should be withdrawn. CEI did not, however,
acknowledge the basic policy decisions involved in deciding
whether to suspend use of the models until a more robust dataset or
model is produced, nor did they discuss whether other, more
accurate predictive models are currently available.52
2. Conflating Responsibility for Producing Research
One of the recurring criticisms of the common law courts’
response to toxic tort cases is their failure to take into account a
manufacturer’s or polluter’s social responsibility to produce basic
evidence on the safety of their activities. Professor Berger and
others have written about the tendency of the common law
causation standard to be imposed in ways that increase the
plaintiffs’ burden of proving harm, despite the fact that the
defendant polluters and manufacturers typically enjoy superior
expertise and often superior knowledge of product harms.53 Indeed,
by requiring plaintiffs to produce this evidence as a prerequisite to
maintaining a viable suit, the common law perversely awards
manufacturer ignorance.54

Compounds Substance File (Jan. 30, 2003) (letter from Paul Gilman, Ph.D.,
Assistant Administrator of EPA, to Jerry Cook, Technical Director, Chemical
Products Division), available at http://www.epa.gov/oei/qualityguidelines/
afreqcorrectionsub/2293Response.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2004).
52
CEI Petition, supra note 33.
53
See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes
Towards a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117
(1997); see also Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure
Litigation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1, 41 (1995); Wagner, supra note 2, at 786-89.
54
There are proposals for reforming the causation standard in keeping with
other burden shifting devices, like res ipsa loquitur, that penalize defendants
from profiting from ignorance regarding the harms they might be imposing on
others. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Causation in Government Regulation and
Toxic Torts, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1307, 1324-25 (1998).
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Rigorous, Daubert-like scientific screening devices act
indirectly to exacerbate the informational burden on plaintiffs by
providing defendants additional opportunities to challenge
plaintiffs’ evidence.55 For example, decisions like Sandoz permit
defendants to challenge the whole of plaintiffs’ causation case
through a single evidentiary hearing that bases resolution of the
case on whether plaintiffs’ weight-of-the-evidence testimony can
be tested.56 There are also reports that Daubert challenges are so
expensive that they can alter the financial calculus of plaintiffs to
bring suit.57
The IQA exacerbates this problem regarding the lack of
manufacturer and polluter responsibility for producing information
on their harmful activities, this time in a legal setting where
Congress specifically intended to lighten the scientific burden of
regulators to respond to health and environmental threats.58 In most
environmental statutes, agencies are directed to pass protective
regulations in the face of uncertainty and to err on the side of
protecting the public health and the environment.59 This creates
incentives for regulated parties to produce exculpatory
information, rather than burdening regulators with heavy
information production requirements. The IQA risks counteracting
these statutory commands to err on the side of public health by
providing regulatory parties with an added mechanism for
challenging scientific evidence before regulations take effect.60
Moreover, since the IQA operates without the requisite notice and
comment process required by the Administrative Procedure Act
55

See Margaret A. Berger, Upsetting the Balance Between Adverse
Interests: The Impact of the Supreme Court’s Trilogy on Expert Testimony in
Toxic Tort Litigation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (2001).
56
See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
57
See infra notes 71-71 and accompanying text.
58
See, e.g., SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 1, at 15.
59
Id.
60
Two more recent and sophisticated petitions exemplify the considerable
extra time and resources that will likely be required of EPA to respond to
lengthy tedious requests for information correction. See CRE, Phthalate Petition,
supra note 33; Perchlorate Study Group, Data Quality Act Petition on three EPA
Technical Documents on Perchlorate, Dec. 3, 2003, available at
http://www.epa.gov/oei/qualityguidelines/afreqcorrectionsub.
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and potentially with no or limited judicial review, this new process
could conceivably be used by agencies themselves to circumvent
statutory commands when it is politically attractive to do so. For
example, the EPA might agree with the IQA petition on Atrazine
and hold that pre-approved protocols are needed before
pathbreaking research on new risks of pesticides will be considered
in regulating those pesticides, even though this decision constitutes
an important policy decision that arguably conflicts with the
protective pesticide mandate61 and should at least undergo notice
and comment.
3. Scientific Errors
The most worrisome aspect of Daubert is the possibility that
judges will make mistakes, particularly in erroneously excluding
valuable scientific evidence.62 Under Daubert, a federal judge
reaches a formal “legal decision” about the reliability of scientific
testimony and its accompanying research. This powerful legal
declaration on scientific quality, if erroneous, might not only
impair the adjudication of a particular case, but might taint
researchers or experts unfairly. Although errors are inevitable,
especially on difficult scientific evidence challenges, there is
currently little systematic research on the frequency or significance
of judicial errors in applying Daubert.
It is not clear whether the agencies are more or less susceptible
to making errors on the technical merits of scientific evidence.
Equipped with an army of scientific staff, the agencies can be
expected to fare better than the courts in their technical
competence to resolve challenges to the quality of scientific
61

See, e.g., Envtl. Defense Fund v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998, 1004 (D.C. Cir.

1976).
62

See David S. Caudill & Lewis H. LaRue, Why Judges Applying the
Daubert Trilogy Need to Know About the Social, Institutional, and Rhetorical—
And Not Just the Methodological—Aspects of Science, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2003)
(arguing that judges who are “unduly focused” on scientific methodology in
applying Daubert “tend to reject reliable—albeit pragmatic—science, welcome
unreliable—albeit authoritative—science, and thereby create a body of legal
science that is out of sync with mainstream science”).
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information. On the other hand, there are frailties in the process
employed by the IQA that might leave agency staff handicapped in
evaluating IQA petitions. The IQA does not provide an adversarial
vetting of the petitions, thus an agency decision-maker will be
looking at only one side of the issue and must rely on its staff to
provide the remaining information needed for a fair evaluation.
Being a political body, moreover, it is possible that an appointed
official could rule on the quality of scientific research based in
large part on political, rather than scientific considerations simply
because it is expedient to do so.
4. Forum Shopping
Forum shopping between the courts and agencies for the most
amenable ruling on the quality of scientific research seems
inevitable once both agencies and courts are shackled by Daubertlike complaint processes. Such forum shopping will only further
confuse the legal system’s collective voice on scientific quality and
lead to even more transaction costs in debating esoteric technical
public health questions. In the summer of 2003, attorneys
defending the asbestos industry in tort litigation engaged in
precisely this forum shopping by filing an IQA petition requesting
EPA to withdraw a 1986 manual warning auto mechanics about
potential exposure to asbestos in brake linings.63 The pamphlet had
been used by plaintiff attorneys to support their causation case, and
the defense lawyers had been unsuccessful in excluding the
evidence under Daubert.64 In their IQA petition, the defense
attorneys argued that EPA’s documentation of the causal
connection between exposure to asbestos in brake linings and
asbestos diseases was incomplete and outdated in the pamphlet.65
Even though the primary regulatory purpose for the manual was to
warn auto mechanics about the risks of encountering asbestos in
brake linings, the IQA subjects this type of information to the same
63

See Morgan, Lewis, & Bockius Petition, supra note 29.
See, e.g., Andrew Schneider, EPA Warning on Asbestos is Under Attack,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 26, 2003, at A1.
65
See Morgan, Lewis, & Bockius Petition, supra note 29, at 4-8.
64

WAGNERMACRO2.DOC

606

4/23/2004 12:54 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

reliability tests as basic research studies and scientific reports. Now
revision of the manual appears to be high on EPA’s list of
priorities solely because of this forum-shopping by frustrated
litigants.66
Conversely, in at least one instance a losing IQA petition has
been appealed to the court of appeals, even though the IQA itself
does not provide a right of judicial review.67 Although it was
unclear how the petitioner could show adverse “direct
consequences” to its organization as a result of public
dissemination of the climate change models, and the complaint was
later withdrawn,68 it is possible to imagine IQA challenges that
will present more compelling judicial appeals in the future.69
Thus, courts might be petitioned to review agency resolutions of
IQA complaints, just as agencies consider administrative
information that litigants are unsuccessful in excluding from the
courts under Daubert.

66

See EPA Response to Morgan, Lewis, & Bockius Petition, Nov. 24,
2003, available at http://www.epa.gov/oeiinter/qualityguidelines/afreqcorrection
sub/12467response-morgan-lewis.pdf.
67
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
68
See, e.g., Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corp. v. EPA,
313 F.3d 852 (4th Cir. 2002).
69
See, e.g., NAS, DATA QUALITY TRANSCRIPT, DAY 1, at 22-23, available
at http://www7.nationalacademies.org/stl/4-21-02_Transcript.doc (comments of
John D. Graham) (noting the uncertainty of judicial review and speculating that
“it will probably take a few critical court decisions before we know how this law
and the associated guidelines will be interpreted by judges”); id. at 73-74
(comments of Alan Morrison) (speculating that under the Data Quality Act,
courts will not hold “de novo review” of the science even though it is
“theoretically possible” that they could); id. at 114-17 (comments of Fred
Anderson) (speculating that parties will be able to get judicial review of agency
information independent from a final rulemaking); id. at 143-44 (comments of
Dan Cohen) (concluding that an agency’s ruling on a correction request is a final
agency action subject to judicial review); id. at 173-74, 181-83 (comments of
Professor Pierce) (expressing initial skepticism about whether courts can review
challenges to agency information, and then later conceding that judicial review
might be possible under limited circumstances).
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B. Process Costs Associated with Implementing a Daubert-like
Test
1. Exacerbating Imbalances in the Review of Science
Daubert has been criticized for causing greater imbalance in
adversarial processes because of the high costs associated with
mounting and defending Daubert challenges.70 Litigants endowed
with greater resources can gain an advantage by raising highly
complex and even unjustified challenges to their less well-financed
opponent’s scientific evidence in order to drain their time and
resources. In civil cases, in fact, the cost of Daubert challenges
appears to be drying up smaller damage litigation because
defending against the inevitable Daubert challenges makes smaller
litigation unprofitable.71 By contrast and somewhat perversely,
forensic evidence introduced by prosecutors in criminal trials
might not undergo rigorous Daubert scrutiny because of the
prevalence of court appointed counsel and the correspondingly
limited resources available for challenging prosecutors’ scientific
evidence.72 Daubert thus helps the richer litigants gain an edge,
70

See, e.g., Ellen Relkin, To Hear or not to Hear: When Are Daubert
Hearings Appropriate?, SF78 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 371, 375 (2001) (reporting that
Daubert hearings can range from a few hours to numerous days and have
evolved into virtual mini-trials involving a myriad of experts from both sides
that can cost parties “tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars”); see also Denise
M. Dunleavy, The Darwin Guide to Survival at a Daubert Challenge, 2Ann.
2001 ATLA-CLE 2775 (2001) (providing lengthy recommendations for
anticipating and then preparing for Daubert hearings, which resemble minitrials).
71
See, e.g., Relkin, supra note 70, at 375 (observing that the costs of
Daubert hearings are being factored into plaintiff attorneys’ decisions to reject
meritorious cases when the injuries are not catastrophic); id. at 381 (reporting
that the defendants’ costs of a Daubert hearing, which the court assigned to the
losing plaintiffs, were $87,887.11 (although only $32,853.16 was documented)
in one case and $26,921.62 in another).
72
See, e.g., NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
WORKSHOP 51 (September 7, 2000), available at http://
www7.nationalacademies.org/stl/Scientific_Evidence_PDF.pdf.
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while doing little for indigent parties who might be most
disadvantaged by poor quality expert testimony.73
The IQA repeats and amplifies these adversarial imbalances.
First and similar to Daubert, the IQA petition process requires
technical sophistication and resources.74 Those without resources
to invest in this exercise may not be able to use the IQA. Rather
than presenting an opportunity for broad-based improvements in
scientific quality, the IQA may instead provide only a limited
opportunity for established, well-financed interest groups to
challenge regulatory information when they do not like the
underlying policies or direction in which an agency is headed.
Exacerbating this imbalance is the fact that IQA petitions are likely
to slow down administrative processes simply by virtue of raising
additional challenges to agency activities that must be resolved
before rulemaking projects can proceed.75 Thus, at least for EPA,
the sophisticated, established interest groups who actually bring
IQA petitions will be limited primarily to the industrial sector since
regulatory delay generally works at cross purposes with public
interest groups’ goals of ensuring the expeditious promulgation of
protective regulation.76 In fact, roughly two-thirds of the IQA
petitions brought against EPA have been filed by industry.77
73

See, e.g., SKAPP REPORT, supra note 43, at 12-14.
See supra note 33.
75
See Wagner, supra note 3, at 106.
76
The only sophisticated, “pro-environment” petition filed against EPA
challenged a new exemption for the oil and gas industry from Clean Water Act
requirements. Delaying the finalization of this exemption would actually lead to
higher environmental protection in the interim, while the petition was being
adjudicated and processed.
77
If one culls out redundant and inapplicable filings, nearly two thirds of
IQA petitions filed against EPA have been filed by regulated industries or
representatives. See Envtl. Prot. Agency, IQA log, at http://www.epa.gov/
oeiinter/qualityguidelines/af_req_correction_sub.htm (last visited March 17,
2004). Interestingly, by contrast, half the petitions filed against the Department
of Interior (DOI) and the Forest Service (FS) are filed by environmental groups,
with the other half filed by affected industry/resource users. See OMB Watch,
Log of IQA Challenges, at http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/1417/
1/171/. In these cases, delays in timber harvesting or introducing new uses or
species is beneficial to environmental interest groups.
74
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Second, and in contrast to Daubert, not all science used in
regulation is subject to the IQA. Instead, the IQA actually exempts
a good portion of privately produced science and focuses
predominantly on federally-funded science.78 Since recent
accounts suggest potentially significant problems with the
reliability of science sponsored by a regulated party and produced
for regulation,79 the focus on public science in the IQA seems the
reverse from what is needed. In fact, a good portion of tort
litigation brought against “regulated” products after the regulator
approved the products for marketing may be the result of
unreliable, privately sponsored research that the regulatory
agencies were forced to use to decide whether the products were
safe.80
Together these imbalances raise doubts about whether the IQA
will improve regulatory science in any meaningful way, or instead
simply opens a point of attack on a subset of regulatory relevant
research where only a few affected parties have the resources or
the incentives to file complaints. The one-directional nature of the
78

First and most sweeping is OMB’s decision to exempt from data quality
challenges all information arising in “adjudications,” a term that includes
information used in permit and licensing decisions. OMB Data Quality
Guidelines, supra note 25, at 8460, § V.8. Although subtle, this exemption
effectively removes from challenge all private information submitted by a
regulated party to obtain a license to market a potentially dangerous product,
including a pesticide, or to obtain a permit to discharge pollution on land, water,
or into the air. OMB’s second exemption applies to third party information that
agencies receive as “public filings.” Id. Thus, annual emissions inventories,
compliance reports, and other filings required of industry under federal law also
appear to be exempt from data quality challenges. Third, OMB exempts all
private information classified as trade secret or confidential business
information, classifications that can include a considerable amount of private
information. Id. § V.3.b.ii.B.i.
79
See, e.g., SHELDON KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST: HAS
THE LURE OF PROFITS CORRUPTED THE VIRTUE OF BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH?
141-44 (2003); Justin E. Bekelman et. al., Scope and Impact of Financial
Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: A Systematic Review, 289 J. AM.
MED. ASSOC. 454 (2003).
80
See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Beyond Buckman: Wrongful
Manipulation of the Regulatory Process in the Law of Torts, 41 WASHBURN L.J.
549, 558-70 (2002).
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IQA reforms—directed at public science, while exempting most
private research—only serves to reinforce concerns about process
imbalances.
2. Potential for Harassment and Abuse of Process
Courts have been the pawn in efforts to disparage and harass
researchers through the ability of litigants to challenge scientific
evidence, although this is rarely accomplished with Daubert
challenges alone. A symposium in Law and Contemporary
Problems, for example, explores how both plaintiff and defense
attorneys abuse the third-party subpoena power to intimidate
scientists whose research produces damaging findings for their
position, even though the researchers are not involved directly in
the litigation.81 The litigants typically accomplish this intimidation
by filing overbroad subpoenas to individual scientists seeking the
release of laboratory notebooks, data, and ongoing research.82
When a public university employs the researcher, litigants have
also used state public records statutes to file broad document
production requests.83 In some cases, the overbroad requests have
also included demands that confidential personal data be disclosed,
and in one case the state judge ordered that it be turned over to the
opposing party, R.J. Reynolds.84 Most courts, however, ultimately
quash the subpoenas, once challenged, as overbroad; yet advocates
seem to understand the gains that can be made simply from the
threat of a subpoena or public records action against an
unsuspecting scientist.85 These abuses of process resulted in at
81

See Symposium, Court-Ordered Disclosure of Academic Research: A
Clash of Values of Science and Law, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1996).
82
See, e.g., Bert Black, Research and its Revelation: When Should Courts
Compel Disclosure?, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 173 (1996); see also
Steven Picou, Compelled Disclosure of Scholarly Research: Some Comments on
“High Stakes Litigation”, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 155 (1996).
83
See Paul M. Fischer, Science and Subpoenas: When Do the Courts
Become Instruments of Manipulation?, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 159
(1996).
84
Id.
85
See, e.g., Black, supra note 82, at 183.
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least one prominent researcher leaving his tenured position in
disgust.86
The misuse of legal tools to intimidate and discredit
researchers can be expected to continue under the IQA. Nobelprize winning economist, George Ackerloff, observes that one of
the best mechanisms for outsiders to assess the reliability of
complex information is by the reputation of the person providing
it.87 Disparaging a scientist, even when the disparagement is
ultimately false, provides one means for undermining the veracity
of complex scientific information. Filing IQA complaints,
including complaints directed at a researcher, offer the possibility
of not only impairing the researcher’s reputation, but promise also
to drain the researcher’s time and energy if the researcher chooses
to become involved in the agency’s IQA response. And in contrast
to the courts, there are no legal deterrents, such as dismissing
frivolous complaints or levying sanctions, to deter these abuses of
process. Under the IQA, parties may file as many petitions as they
like concerning virtually any information they please.88 The costs
of processing the complaints, even if frivolous, are born by the
agency and researchers if they are involved.
Some organizations have already tipped their hand that
intimidating and discrediting researchers may be among their plans
under the IQA. In a complaint petitioning the exclusion of a study
on the herbicide, Atrazine, for example, the industry complained
that the researcher “has killed and continues to kill thousands of
frogs in unvalidated tests that have no proven value.”89 The same
86

See Fischer, supra note 83.
See George Ackerloff, The Market for ‘Lemons’: Qualitative Uncertainty
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970).
88
See, e.g., OMB Data Quality Guidelines, supra note 25, at 8452. The
mandated OMB guidelines interpreting the Data Quality Act provide for its
broad application to “the sharing by Federal agencies of, and access to,
information disseminated by Federal agencies.” Id.
89
Kan. Corn Growers Petition, supra note 33, at 8. Hayes’ scientific
credibility is further questioned in a number of related critiques of his research.
See, e.g., Alex Avery, Frog Sex-Change Claims Flawed, Center for Global Food
Issues (October 30, 2002) at http://www.cgfi.org/materials/articles/2002/
oct_30_02.htm; TRIAZINE NETWORK, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE HAYES ET AL.
(2001)); Steven Milloy, Freaky-Frog Fraud, Fox News Channel, Nov. 8, 2002,
87
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nonprofit then sent letters to the American Association of
University Professors (AAUP) and a number of universities
warning them to update their scientific freedom and responsibility
policies to comply with the IQA,90 and indicating it plans to move
upstream by communicating IQA challenges to the researchers’
federal funding sources.91
Whether this professional discrediting and intimidation
ultimately impairs the researcher’s scientific reputation within the
scientific community or has other negative spillover effects is
unclear, but nevertheless worrisome. While Daubert and the IQA
are not essential to enable such attacks, they do provide additional
public platforms for publicizing complaints against science and
scientists.
C. Countervailing Benefits of the IQA?
Set against its considerable process and substantive costs, the
potential benefits of the IQA appear both minimal and uncertain.

available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,69497,00.html; Steven
Milloy, Frog Study Leaps to Conclusions, Fox News Channel, April 19, 2002,
available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,50669,00.html.
90
Ctr. for Regulatory Effectiveness, Letter from Jim Tozzi, Member, CRE
Advisory Board, to Jane Buck, American Association of University Professors,
3 (Aug. 6, 2003), available at http://www.thecre.com/pdf/university
DQltrBuck.pdf. Identical letters were sent to a number of universities.
91
See Industry Data Quality Warning to Universities Draws Sharp
Response, INSIDE EPA, August 22, 2003. That article reports:
A CRE source says the letter is meant to give universities a chance to
be proactive about data quality requirements. “If they get on top now, it
could save them a lot of problems in the future,” the source says. “If
they don’t . . . we will be more direct in our concerns.” The source says
the next step would be to inform a federal agency that material a
university submitted cannot be disseminated. “If the agency agrees,
then the question is, why give money to universities if they can’t do
anything with their research funds? If we really start to invoke this,
millions of federal government research dollars couldn’t be used . . . .
We’ve been nice up to now. Rounds two and three, we’ll be more
direct.”
Id.
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As discussed, without evidence of a preexisting problem with the
quality of at least EPA’s science, it is unclear what facets of
regulatory information are actually in need of repair. The fact that
the Act was passed as an appropriations rider with no
congressional discussion, and was written by an industry
consultant who now makes a living filing IQA petitions, presents
still more cause for concern.92
Nevertheless, in the wake of the passage of the IQA, there is
evidence of greater attention by agencies like the EPA to scientific
quality. Over the last year and citing to the IQA, EPA and OMB
have generated several new initiatives for increased quality control
over regulatory science.93 Several of these initiatives have been
criticized as misguided and politically motivated, but at least one
initiative—improving the quality of EPA’s models—is
promising.94
The IQA may also cause agencies to think twice before
disseminating information, although it is difficult to locate
concrete evidence of this effect. Whether this ultimately is a
benefit or a cost will depend on the circumstances. If agencies are
disseminating bad information that misleads the public or harms
regulated parties, creating incentives for greater quality control
before disseminating information is precisely what is needed.
92

See supra note 23.
See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Peer Review and Information Quality,
Proposed Bulletin, August 2003, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/inforeg/peer_review_and_info_quality.pdf;
Memo
from
EPA
Administrator Whitman (Feb. 7, 2003), available at http://www.thecre.com/
pdf/whitman_memo.pdf; Envtl. Prot. Agency, A Summary of General
Assessment Factors for Evaluating the Quality of Scientific and Technical
Information, 68 Fed. Reg. 39086 (2003). The guidelines are published
electronically (and not in the Federal Register) at http://www.epa.gov/
oei/qualityguidelines/af— home.htm.
94
EPA’s Assessment Factors were criticized quite heavily at a National
Academy of Sciences Workshop, January 21, 2003. See Transcript from NAS,
Assessment Factors Workshop. OMB’s proposed peer review bulletin generated
even more criticism. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 41; Robert Steinbrook, Peer
Review and Federal Regulations, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 103 (2004); Sharon
Begley, White House Seeks Peer Review Standard for Range of Studies, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 5, 2003, at B1.
93
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Conversely, if agencies become inclined to withhold information
until the point at which they incorporate it into rulemakings., then
the diminished scientific discourse could ultimately impair the
quality of regulations and the thoroughness of public discussions in
advance of rulemakings.
III. REFORM
The opportunity to look more broadly at implementation of a
Daubert-like screening test in both the courts and agencies helps to
spotlight several significant problems. First, these sciencescreening tests offer advantages to sophisticated participants to
manipulate decision-making, in part by overwhelming their
opponents and even the decision-maker through the use of
resource-intensive challenges to science. Second, the tests present
the risk of significant substantive errors, especially in terms of
conflating science and policy disputes.
Both sets of problems could be addressed, at least
preliminarily, by relatively simple reforms. With respect to the
ability of sophisticated participants to abuse the screening devices
to overwhelm opponents and the agencies, one straightforward
remedy is to force those parties to pay for the costs of the process,
and if they abuse it, to penalize the abuses. IQA petitions currently
can be filed at any time, by anyone, and can include as many
complaints and challenges as the petitioner desires. There are no
meaningful costs or sanctions for filing meritless complaints. In
contrast, the benefits of abusing the IQA process can be
considerable to the regulated community: IQA challenges may lead
to the exclusion or discrediting of pivotal studies that undergird
protective regulation, and at the least they can divert an agency’s
resources and priorities away from developing protective
policies.95 Rule 37 already serves as a mechanism for penalizing
frivolous Daubert challenges. 96 A similar type of penalty rule
could be employed by the agencies in implementing the IQA. For
example, if a petitioner does not raise a credible challenge under
95
96

See Wagner, supra note 3, at 106-08.
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 37.
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the IQA, then the petitioner should be forced to pay not only the
agency’s processing costs, but a penalty.
Second, with respect to the vague standard for determining
scientific reliability, separating problems of research bias from
other scientific reliability problems could help to clarify the criteria
for screening scientific evidence and counteract the potential for
petitioners to challenge policy choices under the guise of science.
Currently, both Daubert and the IQA have been criticized for
conflating problems of bias with problems concerning the
reliability of research, and addressing neither (particularly the bias
problem) effectively.97 Moreover, there is evidence that bias is a
serious problem in policy-relevant scientific research, especially
for research sponsored by manufacturers, waste producers, or
regulatory participants or litigants.98 A number of empirical studies
have found that when the research is sponsored, the sponsorship
affects the outcome of the research in a way that is more favorable
to the sponsor than independent research.99 There is also evidence
that sponsors use contractual provisions to control the design and
reporting of research that they sponsor.100 This means that adverse
97

Professor Patterson argues that Daubert conflates at least two important
science-related problems that can afflict scientific evidence—bias on one hand
and whether the testimony is actually scientific on the other. See Mark R.
Patterson, Conflicts of Interest in Scientific Expert Testimony, 40 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1313 (1999). While the Daubert test could be read to encompass both
concerns, it is applied narrowly in ways that generally consider only whether
testimony is based on research that is testable or capable of validation, with
almost no attention to the need to identify bias in the underlying research. This
is an important oversight in the screening of scientific evidence since cross
examination of the witness who relies on the research will not necessarily
uncover blatant conflicts and sources of bias that affected the original researcher
in conducting the research.
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results might be suppressed or under-reported, while positive
results might be presented in ways that overstate the positive
findings. Both the IQA and Daubert, however, tend to ignore these
important sources of bias in scientific research.101
One reform to redress this research “bias” problem is to
supplement the “reliability” tests of Daubert and the IQA with a
conflict disclosure requirement. The scientific community uses
conflict disclosures to require disclosure not only of the sources of
funding, but the types of sponsor influence—like contractual
power to suppress adverse results or alter the written report of the
findings—that might affect the rigor of the study. When employed
by regulators and courts in a legal setting, such expanded conflict
disclosures would require scientists who offer testimony or
research to disclose all contractual and related constraints that
could bias or constrain their work.102 Similarly, scientists who are
employees of sponsors would be required to disclose the extent of
sponsor influence over the design, methods, and reporting of their
research. When the testimony or evidence is not being offered by
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Clinical Trials, 282 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 1766 (1999); Drummond Rennie,
Veronica Yank, & Linda Emanuel, When Authorship Fails: A Proposal to Make
Contributors Accountable, 278 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 579 (1997); see also PAUL
BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL
(1985); DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT: A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE
WITH A DEADLY INDUSTRY (2001); GARY MARKOWITZ & DAVID ROSNER,
DECEIT AND DENIAL: THE DEADLY POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION (2002);
MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE
DALKON SHIELD (1985).
101
See, e.g., Frank Davidoff et al., Sponsorship, Authorship and
Accountability, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 825 (2001), available at
http://content.nejm.org/cgi/reprint/345/11/825.pdf; Jean Hellwege, Medical
Journals Crack Down on Industry Influenced Over Published Studies, 37 TRIAL
71 (DEC. 2001); Uniform Requirements for Manuscripts Submitted to
Biomedical Journals (October 2001) at http://www.icmje.org (last visited Mar.
2, 2004).
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This proposal was advanced by David Michaels and myself in David
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Regulatory Science, 302 SCIENCE 2073 (2003).
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the original scientist, then those relying on the information would
be required to work backwards to learn about potential conflicts
and contractual constraints that might compromise the
independence of the research.103 Both in the courts and agencies,
these conflict disclosures need not be used to disqualify research or
testimony, but they could provide critical information about
potential sources of bias that might otherwise be missed.
Adding this supplemental conflict disclosure will diminish the
severity of several of the adverse side effects currently experienced
under Daubert and the IQA. Most significantly, it offers a much
more focused method for assessing the objectivity of research and
the corresponding expert testimony than the amorphous Daubert
test.104 This more focused approach to evaluating research and
testimony should also help counteract the ability of well-financed,
private parties to use Daubert and the IQA exclusively to their
advantage. A detailed conflict disclosure policy imposes a speed
bump on all research. without requiring an outside, sophisticated
advocate to intervene. The conflict disclosure requirement could
even provide some protection against harassment of independent
scientists who are most deserving of protection from the current
abuses of process.
CONCLUSION
Daubert has not been without its problems. These problems are
instructive as the agencies implement the IQA, a law that imposes
a complaint process similar to Daubert on information
disseminated by federal agencies. This commentary explores some
of the adverse side effects that could arise in importing a Daubertlike test to the agencies and suggests two straightforward reform
proposals that begin to counteract these problems.
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